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 Preparing for catastrophic climate change




We study optimal adaptation to climate change when the harmful
consequences of global warming are associated with stochastic occur-
rence of abrupt changes. The adaptation policy entails the accumula-
tion of a particular sort of capital that will eliminate or reduce the catas-
trophic damage of an abrupt climate change when (and if) it occurs. The
occurrence date is uncertain. The policy problem involves balancing the
tradeo￿s between the (certain) investment cost prior to occurrence and
the bene￿t (in reduced damage) that will be realized after the (uncer-
tain) occurrence date. For stationary economies the optimal adaptation
capital converges to a steady state. For growing economies the optimal
adaptation capital stock approaches the maximal economic level above
which further accumulation is ine￿ective.
JEL classi￿cation: O13, Q54
Keywords: climate change, adaptation, hazard
∗Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, POB 12, Rehovot 76100, Israel (tsur@agri.huji.ac.il). Yacov Tsur acknowledges
the support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scienti￿c Research (NWO).
♢
Corresponding author: VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV The
Netherlands. Email: c.a.a.m.withagen@vu.nl1 Introduction
Climate policy measures can be categorized as mitigation or adaptation.
The former aims to prevent or reduce anthropogenic processes that (are be-
lieved to) a￿ect climate change, e.g., emission of greenhouse gases (GHG),
thereby preventing or delaying its harmful consequences. The latter is con-
cerned with reducing or eliminating climate change induced damages once they
occur.1 Examples of adaptive measures include using arti￿cial snow making in
the Alps, the construction of levees to prevent ￿ooding of plain areas as a result
of rising seawater, or the development of crop varieties immune to pathogens
that are likely to ￿ourish with changes in certain climate characteristics.
Since the atmosphere is a global, open-access and common resource, pre-
ventive policies, such as reduction of global GHG emission, require concerted
and coordinated international e￿ort, in which the scope of a single country
to in￿uence policy is limited (Dockner and Long 1993, Barrett 2003). On the
other hand, a country can signi￿cantly a￿ect climate change-induced damages
that may be in￿icted upon it by undertaking appropriate adaptive measures
well in advance. From the vantage point of countries that are vulnerable to
irreversible consequences of climate change, proactive adaptive policies may
well be preferred to mitigation policies. 2 In this work we focus on adaptive
climate policies.
The situation considered is that of a country under threat of a catastrophic
damage that may be induced by abrupt climate change. The climate change
1Adaptation policies are de￿ned by Parry et al. (2007, p. 6) as "Adjustment in natural
or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli of their e￿ects, which
moderates harm or exploits bene￿cial opportunities."
2"Mitigate we might, adapt we must" argues Nordhaus (1994, p. 189), while Klein et al.
(2007) add that adaptation is not enough without mitigation (see discussion in Shalizi and
Lecocq 2010).
1process is exogenous (to the single country) and the onset of the abrupt catas-
trophic event is uncertain. An adaptation policy entails investing in a partic-
ular sort of capital that will reduce the damage in￿icted by the calamity when
it occurs. This investment consumes resources and entails real costs but yields
bene￿ts only after the catastrophe occurs. The policy design problem involves
the investment and buildup of the adaptation capital in light of the delicate
tradeo￿s between the (certain) investment costs prior to occurrence and the
bene￿ts after (the uncertain) occurrence.
The damage in￿icted by a catastrophic climate change can assume di￿er-
ent forms, shapes and scales, depending on the nature of the catastrophe (rise
in seawater, disease outburst, extended drought) and on the a￿icted location
(see the taxonomy of events-damages in De Zeeuw and Zemel 2011). Following
Karp and Tsur (2011), we assume that the event reduces income by a certain
share from the occurrence date onwards. The innovation here is to make this
reduction a function of the stock of the adaptation capital at the occurrence
date. The ￿ow of investment bene￿ts can then be associated with the reduc-
tion in the expected income loss vis-￿-vis the expected loss that would have
been realized without the investment (or under di￿erent investment policies).
We characterize the optimal investment policy and show how it depends on
preferences (time discounting and aversion to intergenerational inequality),
the (exogenous) catastrophic hazard, the marginal productivity of preventive
capital, and the scale and severity of the damage.
We ￿nd that for stationary economies (without exogenous or endogenous
technical change), investment in adaptation capital may not always be war-
ranted, depending on time preferences, aversion to intergenerational inequal-
ity, the catastrophic hazard (occurrence risk) and the severity of the ensuing
2damage. When undertaking adaptation measures is warranted, which is al-
ways the case for truly catastrophic damages, the optimal adaptation capital
process converges monotonically to a unique steady state. In contrast, grow-
ing economies should always engage in adaptation and eventually build the
corresponding capital stock to the point beyond which it is no longer e￿ective.
The next section lays out the model’s components and speci￿es the policy
problem. Sections 3 and 4 characterize the optimal policy for stationary and
growing economies, respectively, and provide insights into some salient prop-
erties. Section 5 concludes and the appendix contains technical derivations.
2 Adaptive policy speci￿cation
Harmful consequences of global warming are often associated with abrupt
changes that give rise to catastrophic damages. Each link in the chain leading
from anthropogenic change of atmospheric GHG concentration to the occur-
rence of abrupt climate change and the ensuing catastrophic damage involves
uncertain elements (Schelling 2007). Following Clarke and Reed (1994) and
Tsur and Zemel (1996, 1998), we account for these considerations by assuming
that a catastrophic (abrupt) climate change will occur at an uncertain time T
whose distribution depends on atmospheric GHG concentration. The latter is
exogenous to a single country. We assume ￿rst a constant hazard rate, denoted
h, so the distribution and density of T are, respectively, F(t) = 1   e−ht and
f(t) = he−ht.3 The event reduces income by a share ψ(k(T)) from the occur-
rence date onward, where k is damage control capital and ψ : [0,1] 7! [0,1]
3The modi￿cations needed to account for (exogenously) increasing hazard are outlined
in 3.1 below.
3satis￿es
1  ψ(0) > ψ(1)  0; ψ
′(k) < 0andψ
′′(k) > 08k 2 [0, k); ψ
′(k) = 08k   k.
(2.1)
Thus, the share of income loss is a decreasing and convex function of the stock
of adaptive capital. The maximal e￿ective adaptive capital  k may be ￿nite or
in￿nite.
To allow a sharper focus on adaptation policy, we assume away productive
capital. This is consistent with a neoclassical growth model in which capi-
tal and income grow at a constant rate and the saving rate is constant. The
rate of growth (driven by exogenous technical change) is denoted g. With
initial income normalized to unity, the ￿ow of income prior to the occur-
rence of the event is egt. Let x(t) represent the share of income invested in
(adaptation) capital k at time t, so income is allocated between consumption,
egt(1 x(t)), and investment in adaptation capital, egtx(t). Adaptation capital,
then, evolves according to
_ k(t) = e
gtx(t)   δk(t), (2.2)
where δ is the depreciation rate. After the occurrence date there is no role
for adaptive actions and consumption equals egt(1   ψ(k(T))). We assume
that there is no depreciation of capital after the event, or that depreciation is
irrelevant.4





1− , respectively, where η > 0 is the elasticity parameter.
4For example, dykes protect a given area and depending on their height occurrence
implies that a certain fraction is ￿ooded and becomes useless for production after the ￿ood.
Alternatively, egt(1    (k(T))) could represent the maximal welfare that can be realized
after the event took place. The important issue is that the event occurrence reduces the
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The optimal adaptive policy consists of the investment and capital processes,
x∗(t) 2 [0,1], k∗(t), t  0, that maximize (2.5) subject to (2.2), given initial
capital k(0) = k0 <  k. The nonnegativity of x(t) follows from the irreversibility
of k (which cannot be used for consumption). The upper bound ( x  1) re￿ects
the requirement that investment in damage control cannot exceed income.
We proceed to characterize the optimal adaptation policy, considering sta-
tionary (g = 0) and growing ( g > 0) economies separately.





1− e− ~ tI(T > t)dt, where I() assumes
the value 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise, and take expectation with re-





1− e−(~ +h)tdt. The expectated value of the second term
is
 ∞
0 e− ~ t (1− (k(t))
1−





(1−)~  e−(~ +h)tdt, which upon adding to the ￿rst
term gives (2.5).
53 Optimal policy: stationary economy (g = 0)
The current-value Hamiltonian corresponding to the above problem (sup-






1− + h(1   ψ(k))
1−)
+ m(x   δk),
where m is the current-value costate variable (shadow price of k). Necessary
conditions for an optimum include
 (1   x)
− + m  0, equality holds if x > 0, (3.1)
_ m   (ρ + h + δ)m = (h/ρ)(1   ψ(k))
−ψ
′(k) (3.2)
and the transversality condition He−(~ +h)t ! 0.
The ￿rst condition says that the marginal utility of consumption should
equal the marginal opportunity cost of consuming rather than investing the
last income unit. The second condition is an arbitrage condition. 6
In an optimal steady state (where _ k = _ m = 0), (2.2) and (3.1)-(3.2) imply
that
(1   δk)







ρ(ρ + h + δ)
. (3.4)
6In discrete time it would read
m(t + 1) + (h=)(1    (k))−(  
′(k))   :m(t) = m(t) + ( + h)m(t)
The right-hand side gives tomorrow’s revenues of putting an amount m in the bank today.
The left-hand side is the return on investing the same amount in one (marginal unit of
capital), consisting of the capital gain, the discounted total marginal utility of permanently
higher consumption in case the catastrophe occurs minus depreciation of capital.
6Since (1   δk)− increases in k and (2.1) implies that φ() is decreasing, (3.3)
can have at most one root in (0,1/δ). Denote by ~ k the solution of (3.3) if such
a solution exists in (0, 1
). Since (1   δk)− equals 1 at k = 0 and explodes as
k approaches 1/δ, the condition
φ(0) > 1 (3.5)
guarantees that ~ k 2 (0, 1
) exists.
We can now characterize the optimal policy as follows:
Proposition 1. Suppose g = 0 and (2.1) holds. (i) If φ(0) > 1, adaptive in-
vestment is warranted and the optimal capital trajectory k∗(t) converges mono-
tonically to a steady state at ~ k 2 (0, 1
). (ii) If φ(0)  1, no adaptive invest-
ment is warranted (x∗(t) = k∗(t) = 0 for all t  0).
A formal proof is given in the appendix. Here we provide an intuitive
explanation with the aid of a phase diagram. In the diagram (Figure 1),
capital k is on the horizontal axis and the consumption share 1   x on the
vertical axis. k is constant when 1   x = 1   δk. Thus along the _ k = 0
isocline, 1 x = 1 for k = 0 and 1 x ! 0 as k approaches 1/δ. Noting (3.2),
the consumption share is constant for (1 x) = (φ(k))−1=, with φ(k) de￿ned
in (3.4). The function φ(k) is decreasing for k <  k and constant thereafter.
Hence the consumption share increases along the isocline. The ￿gure depicts
the case where  k > 1/δ and φ(0) > 1, in which the two isoclines intersect in
(0,1/δ). It is seen that in this case the steady state (the intersection point)
is globally stable, which provides the intuition of the ￿rst part of Proposition
3.1. The second part of the Proposition corresponds to the case in which the
locus of points where 1   x is constant lies entirely above the _ k = 0 isocline
7and, with small initial capital, the economy is trapped in a situation where
the adaptive capital stock necessaritly goes to zero.
1 x   
k   1/G  
(1 )/ 0 d x dt     
/ 0 dk dt    
1 
Figure 1: A phase diagram explanation of Proposition 1.






ρ(ρ + h + δ)
in determining whether or not adaptive action is warranted. The e￿ect of the
damage function enters via
− ′(0)
(1− (0)) . It is seen that both larger  ψ
′(0) and
ψ(0) closer to one increase φ(0), thus also the desirability of adaptive action
(in the sense of making condition (3.5) more likely to hold). A larger  ψ
′(0)
implies that initially (when k = 0) adaptive investment is more e￿ective in
reducing the damage. A ψ(0) closer to one implies larger damage without
adaptive action. The doomsday case corresponds to ψ(0) = 1, in which case
φ(0) explodes, ensuring condition (3.5) and the desirability of adaptive action.
8The φ(0) expression also illuminates the role of the preference parameters,
η and ρ (recall that ~ ρ = ρ when g = 0), the hazard rate, h, and the depreciation
rate δ. As expected, a larger ρ depresses the desirability of adaptive action, in
that it decreases φ(0), by discounting more heavily future post-event bene￿ts
associated with the damage reduction. The elasticity η, on the other hand,
increases the desirability of adaptive action (in that it increases φ(0)). This
can be understood by noting the role of η as a measure of aversion to inter-
generational inequality (larger η implies higher aversion to inter-generational
inequality): failing to take adaptive action today means increasing the welfare
of the present generation at the expense of future generations (that will su￿er
by the climate-induced catastrophe when it hits), hence it increases inter-
generational inequality.
The hazard e￿ect is, as expected, positive (it increases φ(0)): a larger h
(with the ensuing larger occurrence probability) implies a larger risk, thus more
scope for adaptive action. Since δ constitutes (part of) the price of adaptive
investment, it negatively a￿ects adaptive investment.
3.1 Increasing hazard
Extending the analysis to the case of non-constant hazard is straightfor-
ward. Suppose the hazard increases over time (e.g., with atmospheric GHG
concentration which is exogenous to the country under consideration) and ap-
proaches the upper bound  h in the long run. The distribution and density of
T become F(t) = 1   e−
 t
0(~ +h(s))ds and f(t) = h(t)e−
 t
0(~ +h(s))ds , respectively,




(1   η)~ ρ
[
~ ρ(1   x(t))






The present-value Hamiltonian is
H(t) =
1
(1   η)~ ρ
(
~ ρ(1   x(t))






where λ(t) is the present-value costate (shadow price of capital). With m(t) =
λ(t)e
 t
0(~ +h(s))ds the current-value costate, the necessary conditions (3.1)-(3.2)
remain valid (with h = h(t)). The long-run behavior of the economy is the
same as that with a constant hazard  h, but the time pro￿le of h(t) a￿ects the
transition dynamics approach to the steady state.




(1   η)~ ρ
(
~ ρ(1   x)




and necessary conditions for (an interior) optimum include
 (1   x)
− + me
gt = 0, (4.1)
_ m   (~ ρ + h + δ)m = (h/~ ρ)(1   ψ(k))
−ψ
′(k) (4.2)
and the transversality condition He−(~ +h)t ! 0.
It turns out that
10Lemma 1. Under the optimal policy, m(t) ! 0 as t ! 1.
The proof is given in the appendix. The optimal policy characterization for a
growing economy can now be stated:
Proposition 2. Suppose g > 0 and (2.1) holds. Then, the optimal capital
process k∗(t) approaches  k as t ! 1. If  k is ￿nite, the investment process
x∗(t) evolves in the long run along the δ ke−gt path and vanishes asymptotically.




∗(t)) = 0, (4.3)
ensuring, noting (2.1), k∗(t) !  k. If  k is ￿nite, then (2.2) implies that in the
long run x∗(t) = δ ke−gt.
As time goes by, a growing economy can more easily a￿ord investing in
adaptation capital, since the same fraction of income generates increasing in-
vestment rates. Moreover, the damage that will be in￿icted by the catastrophic
climate change is proportional to the size of the economy, hence rises as the
economy grows and so is the bene￿t of damage reduction, i.e., of adaptation
capital. Together, these two motives imply that a growing economy should
(eventually) invest in adaptive capital to the point where its marginal produc-
tivity vanishes.
5 Conclusion
Countries that are vulnerable to potentially catastrophic and irreversible
consequences of climate change will often ￿nd it bene￿cial to prepare well in
advance for such calamities rather than wait and hope that the international
11community will take the precautionary actions needed to avert or mitigate
(anthropogenic drivers of) climate change. We study how to prepare for catas-
trophic climate change by means of accumulation of adaptive capital that will
reduce the damage in￿icted by the calamity when it occurs. The catastrophic
damage is triggered by an abrupt climate change that will occur at an un-
certain time. The occurrence time distribution (or hazard) depends on the
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, which is exogenous to a single
country.
For a stationary economy (no technical change), we ￿nd that whether or
not adaptation actions are warranted depend on the discount rate, the aversion
to intergenerational inequality, the catastrophic risk (hazard) and the severity
of the catastrophic damage. If adaptation is warranted, which is always the
case for truly catastrophic (large damage) threats, we ￿nd that the optimal
adaptation capital approaches monotonically a unique steady state.
In contrast, a growing economy will always ￿nd it bene￿cial to undertake
adaptation actions by investing in adaptation capital up to the point where it
is no longer e￿ective. This is so because, as time goes by, a growing economy
can more easily a￿ord investing in adaptation capital, since the same fraction
of income generates larger investment rates, and moreover the damage that will
be in￿icted (upon occurrence of the catastrophic climate change) increases as
the economy grows and so is the bene￿t of damage reduction (i.e., of adaptation
capital).
These results were obtained in a stylized setting, which can and should
be extended in several directions. It would be interesting to have productive
capital in addition to adaptive capital and see how their accumulations are
interrelated. This will allow analyzing a growth model with savings for two
12potential purposes. It has also been assumed that the climate change calamity
occurs only once. However, after having incurred one catastrophic occurrence
another could arrive, and this is not modeled here (see Tsur and Zemel 1998,
for a modeling of recurrent event). During the post-event period of a once-
and-for-all event, welfare depends upon the existing adaptive capital stock and
there is no role for adaptation policy. In a recurrent event setting, adaptation
policy continues to be relevant after occurrence as well.
13Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
We note ￿rst that the optimal state process k∗(t) is monotonic. To verify
this, consider ￿rst the case where the optimal policy is unique and suppose that
k∗(t) is not monotonic, i.e., for some 0  t1 < t2, k∗(t1) = k∗(t2) while k∗(t1)
increases (resp. decreases) and k∗(t2) decreases (resp. increases), so x∗(t1) >
x∗(t2) (resp. x∗(t1) < x∗(t2)). But for autonomous problems the control
can be expressed as a function of the state, implying x∗(t1) = x∗(k∗(t1)) =
x∗(k∗(t2)) = x∗(t2) ￿ a contradiction. If the optimal policy is not unique, at
least one optimal state process is monotonic (see Hartl 1987, and Tsur and
Zemel 1994).
Since x(t)  1, the capital process is bounded above by 1/δ. It follows
that k∗(t) must converge monotonically to a steady state in [0, 1
]. Let a ^
over a variable indicate steady state. Then, (2.2) implies ^ x = δ^ k, (3.1) gives
^ m = (1   ^ x)− and, using _ ^ m = 0, (3.2) gives ^ m = φ(^ k). Together, these
equations imply that the steady state capital stock ^ k must satisfy (3.3).
(i) Under (2.1) and (3.5), equation (3.3) admits a unique solution ~ k 2 (0, 1
),
thus ^ k = ~ k > 0, establishing the claim.
(ii) When φ(0)  1, then φ(k) < 1 for any k > 0 and there exists no
positive k that solves (3.3). Undertaking a positive investment implies, by
virtue of the monotonicity of the optimal state process, that the optimal capital
process must converge to a positive steady state and the latter must satisfy
(3.3) ￿ a contradiction. The optimal policy in this case is therefore not to
undertake any adaptive investment.
14B Proof of Lemma 1
If m(t) does not vanish asymptotically, then, for large enough t, either (i)
there exists some τ such that m(t)  ϵ > 0 for all t  τ, or (ii) m(t) is cyclical.
We show that neither case is possible.
Case (ii): Suppose there exists some τ such that m(t)  ϵ > 0 for all
t  τ. For large enough t, m(t)  ϵ > 0 implies, noting (4.1), that x(t) is
close to 1 and (2.2) implies that k(t) t 1
g+egt. The transversality condition
He−(+h)t ! 0 requires e−(~ +h)tm(t)[egtx(t)   δk(t)] ! 0 or e−(~ +h)tm(t)(egt  
δk(t)) = e−(~ +h)tm(t)egt(1   
g+) ! 0, hence e−(~ +h−g)tm(t) ! 0.
Now the necessary condition (4.2) can be written as





~ (~ +h+) is de￿ned in (3.4) with ~ ρ instead of ρ. Since
k(t) increases inde￿nitely, (2.1) implies that φ(k(t)) ! 0 and asymptotically
m(t)  e(~ +h+)t, in violation of the transversality condition e−(~ +h−g)tm(t) !
0 and ruling out Case (i).
Case (ii): If m(t) is cyclical, there exist pairs t1 < t2 such that m(t1) =
m(t2)  ϵ > 0, _ m(t1) > 0 and _ m(t2) < 0, for arbitrarily large t1. For large
enough t1, m(t)  ϵ > 08t 2 [t1,t2] and (4.1) imply x(t)  18t 2 [t1,t2], in
which case, noting (2.2), _ k(t)  08t 2 [t1,t2] so k(t1)  k(t2) and φ(k(t1)) 
φ(k(t2)). Invoking (4.2) gives
_ m(t1)   _ m(t2) = (~ ρ + h + δ)[φ(k(t2))   φ(k(t1))]  0,
contradicting _ m(t1) > 0 and _ m(t2) < 0 and ruling out this case.
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